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Lawrence Kimmel 
 
The Mythic Journey of a Changeling 
 
Once upon a time, there was a creature that crawled out of the sea and… 
Once upon a time, there was a creature made perfect who met a serpent in a garden and… 
Once upon a time, there were heroic creatures on earth that strove against the gods and… 
 
There are many such tales in the archaic moorings of our collective memory, but 
one in particular that seems inclusive if indeterminate: Once upon a time there was a 
creature that came out of the darkness with a only a faint memory of water, and sand, and 
cold, and fear to discover that its very life depended on telling a story about its origins—
of which it had no clear memory, and its destiny—of which it had no certain knowledge.  
What more fabulous to conceive than this creature which, having lost its tail, dreams of 
growing wings?  It is a being whose nature transforms itself and the world it inhabits but, 
for all this, keeps running up against its own limits: neither Ape nor Angel, it remains a 
creature caught between, looking through a fractured mirror at possibilities always just 
beyond reach.  It is a changeling creature, a child seeming stolen from the gods. 
I 
Historical fantasies in language and life: The nature and reach of language has 
been variously construed by philosophers with only a common acknowledgement that it 
is the single instrument we have toward a comprehensive critical discernment of life and 
world.  It remains a critical issue, however, whether the entire range of meaning can and 
should be used in comprehending truth and reality.  It may be well to clarify at the outset 
the difference in these two questions.  Truth has many forms, indeed truth is a matter of 
form.  Reality, on the other hand, however and wherever manifest, is a matter of flow 
rather than form.  Its modality is one of continual transformation.  If the limits of our 
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world are the limits of our language, then it makes a world of difference if we confine our 
language to facts. Even the most fundamental forms of knowledge in science are 
discontinuous and subject to paradigm shifts, but reality is itself formless and suffers no 
such fixations.  Inquiries concerning truth invariably require a calculus of language with 
an abridgment of meaning, but if we move from the question of what is true to what is 
real there can be no final abridgement of language and no abstractions into a calculus. 
The world of reality unlike the world of truth refers to the whole of what is possible—that 
is, to whatever is meaningful within the range and sense of language. 
In ancient classical philosophy the long standing ‗quarrel‘ that Plato alludes to 
between literature and philosophy is framed in many different ways, most particularly as 
that between mythos and logos.  It has an historical sequel in the divide between Plato‘s 
rejection of the value of rhetorical discourse and its reinstatement by Aristotle.  Two 
philosophers in the modern period have similarly commented on a kind of conceptual 
schism in the relation of language and world:  With regard to Nietzsche‘s rhetorical claim 
that there are no facts, only interpretations, Wittgenstein offered the logical corrective 
that not everything can be an interpretation. 
While these seem to be contradictory claims (as Wittgenstein so intended in his 
reminder to Nietzsche) they can also be regarded as compatible remarks about and within 
the world of sense and meaning.  Interpretations can only be interpretations of something, 
of course, but that something can be other than a fact—e.g. it may be an assumption or 
postulate, or else be grounded in a social or existential commitment unrelated to a factual 
claim.  The point here is that to call something a fact whether in common sense or 
science, is to give it a value, or accept it as constituted by a value. The world is not 
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reducible to facts in the absence of some determining structure of agreement as to what 
will count as a fact.  In scientific discourse and practice this is commonly expressed as 
‗all observations are theory laden‘ with the general implication that all seeing is ‗seeing 
as…‘  To put it differently, no intelligible world—including that of physics—consists in a 
totality of facts.  The world in which we live is not made up simply of things, nor is it 
comprehended by facts: facts are not the building blocks of meaning, only one of its 
potential attributes which in turn requires interpretation.  To put the matter in terms other 
than interpretation and as it will be addressed in this essay: the world in which we live is 
meaningful in terms of the stories that we tell, stories that we share, stories we remember 
and stories that we live.  Stories and the lives they embrace are neither constituted nor 
limited by an independent description of facts.  They are formed and edited in terms of 
the perspectives and interpretations we bring to the experiences we share. 
Aristotle‘s indelible inscription in the bedrock of western thought—that Man is a 
creature with Logos—is a point of departure and a point directly in question concerning 
the issue historical fabulation.  In the specific context and currency of his time Aristotle‘s 
definition focused on the rational discourse of self governance so that his original claim 
split into the memorialized definition that as a possessor of Logos or speech, Man is a 
rational and a political animal.  These two features of Logos are of course the result of an 
interpretation of a founding claim that intellectual history has since adopted as the 
defining capacity of human-being.  So understood it has the effect of restricting the 
cognitive limits of language to discursive reason. 
But another interpretation can and has been given to ‗Man is a creature with 
Logos‘ (words/ speech/ language) that does not center in logic nor serve the narrow limits 
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of control in reason and rule.  As a creature with Logos, Man is understood as having the 
capacity to tell stories—that is, as an alternative to Aristotle‘s governing definition, Man 
is a story-telling animal.  Man is a creature graced not only in a faculty needed to reason 
and govern, but able to put her life and experience into stories.  The stories we live by are 
legion—collectively they comprise the different human concerns investigated by religion, 
history, philosophy, biology, economics…  Within each of these collective accounts the 
dominant interpretation in western intellectual and political history has been that of rule 
and reason, logic and legislation—that is, it has biased Aristotle‘s interpretation of Logos.  
This bias has tended to establish and direct the central use of language to that of 
control—of the environment, of the world, of others, of ourselves.  Such a bias in 
philosophical terms represents an ambition to reduce meaningful discourse to the 
category of facts and so use language (Logos) to constrain the myriad possibilities of 
imagination toward a matrix of control.  This project was made explicit in logical 
positivism but it is residual as well in the general culture. 
It is instructive to consider what a shared life-world would become if it were 
reduced to a discourse of facts, in which no stories are told, or rather, just one story, the 
recounting of facts according to the master narrative in which all facts are given or from 
which they are derived.  As a case in point, and reflective of a dominant male culture still 
in keeping with the Classical Greek bias, the traditional form of autobiography has been 
that of factual summary.  In Lionel Trilling‘s wonderful story about college teaching, Of 
This Time, Of that Place…, a class of first year students is assigned to write an initial 
essay about who they are and why they have come to the college.  The responses all take 
the form: ‗My name is James Bierbower III. I was born on…in…and went to school 
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at…my father, James Bierbower II and his father… were born and raised…‘ –a series of 
related facts and events that frame the endowed life of an entitled class at a small liberal 
arts college.  The one exception to this litany of sameness is a student who begins his 
essay by seeming to reject the essay question: ‗Of this time, of that place, of some 
heritage… what does that matter to those of us now engaged in the creative adventure of 
learning…?‘  It turns out, of course, that it does matter, and throughout the term, the 
teacher is hard pressed and finally unable to locate this student on any spectrum of 
acceptable discourse and decides that he cannot pass his work.  However brilliant in other 
ways, the boy simply does not fit in, nor fit the mold of common sensibility grounded in 
the factual discourse of learning and life.  His work is eventually consigned to a discard 
pile of student failures.  There is a tragic context in the telling of this story which would 
take us aside from the limited point of our interest here which is to note the standard of 
autobiography in the listing of facts and events in standard categories of social 
accountability. 
In contrast to this factual encasement the emerging literature of the feminine 
movement has produced new voices that have found a different way to shape the 
possibilities of autobiography more in keeping with the complexities of our changing life 
stories.   In this literature a life-story can well begin at any point that constitutes a 
significant sense of its coherence and importance, nor is one limited to a single starting 
point or narrative.  One might begin a story of her life: ‗I was abandoned by my 
parents...‘ and so a life narrative unfolds in terms of that critical perception and 
experience.  But at another juncture, or just as well, this autobiography may be 
transformed along with the life of its telling: ‗I first met my birth mother on my 
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graduation from middle school…‘  Where one starts is critical for the narrative, 
obviously, and also critical for the life of its telling, but that place is not assigned by any 
objective order in terms of its importance or the coherence of the narrative.  Language is 
a tool for many purposes, and the meaning of a life cannot be determined independently 
of the story in which it is framed; to the extent that there are optional narratives, there 
exist also different life possibilities.  No one is stuck with one set of determining facts, no 
matter how hard the circumstances of her life. 
 In a world fast losing its tether to religious conviction, moral objectivity, universal 
reason, political solvency, ecological sensibility…it may be that all we have left are 
stories to replace the once endowed gods, the enshrined templates of True, Good, 
Beautiful, Sacred…except of course that the gods and these various testaments were all 
and in themselves stories and the products of stories.  Hopefully we can avoid 
succumbing to any insistence that there is only one way to see the world (e.g. physics), 
one way to consider life (biology), as once people were persuaded or forced to think there 
was but one God –their own (theology.)  I trust it is not necessary to note here that this is 
in no way to dismiss the importance of any particular story—e.g. physics or biology—or 
to debunk any efforts to assess truth, goodness, or the sacred.  This is only to suggest that 
the meaning and value of any discourse is related to the context of the stories being told.  
 Our lives individually and collectively are comprised of stories in which events 
are recorded, interpreted, evaluated, edited, but also in which possibilities, 
disappointments, alternatives, dreams, regrets, hopes are woven into the narrative; 
occasionally, our experiences may be sufficiently shaken by joy or sorrow such that a 
whole paradigm shifts in the narrative.  It is in this sense that historical fabulations 
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surround our most ordinary lives, extend and inform the range of our possibilities as 
human beings. 
 We are in fact not bound by facts.  If we have a nature, it is one that we have 
given to ourselves in some accepted story or other and which remains ever a work in 
progress.  Does this mean there are no facts that form the boundaries of life and world?  
No, only that the facts in our lives are first of all dependent on the meaning of our 
experience—individually and collectively, existentially and historically—in  its myriad 
forms and flaws; it is only in this flexible and variable way that the meaning of our lives 
is ever ‗determined by the facts.‘ 
 What I am arguing for, then, is more a plea for the centrality of metaphor in 
language (Logos) and of imagination in life—for the possibilities embedded in a living 
language that is addressed to the comprehensive if indeterminate richness and complexity 
of human existence.  To put it in another way the division of Logos from Mythos and the 
related genders of language that estrange and hermetically seal facts from the reach of 
fiction and fantasy must be reconciled in order to create the life stories in which we find 
meaning.  
II   
 True stories:  some say that in the beginning there was a great void and out of 
Chaos came Desire and Destiny and the ensuing generation of first things.  Others say 
that in the beginning darkness covered the earth but the creator brought forth light and 
knelt down in its early mist to breathe life into the clay.  Still others say that in the first 
three seconds of the universe there was a cosmic mix of mass and energy that generated 
life.  Like most autobiographies, the self-life-writing of human-being can begin at any 
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particular moment that is memorable or that the retrospective mind finds especially 
compelling.  Some picture human life to be that of a naked ape whose existence in the 
world of his own making is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.  Others imagine that 
of one race are gods and men.  The story seems to depend on where and when the teller, 
and what the point of telling or taleing.  But no story holds title to truth for, of course, the 
story itself is in process, the subject in transit, the end in question. 
 We attribute to the writers in the age of Classical Greece, particularly the critical 
historians and philosophers, the intuition that it was important to get things right, to give 
reasons and argue for perspectives about the name and nature of Man.  It is not 
uncommon to suppose that in the gradual transformation of mythos into logos—of 
emergent sense into manifest truth—that we have left well behind as vestigial myth the 
primal energy and spiritual core of generative stories.  But to think so is a mistake. 
History is still a story, allegory survives at the heart of philosophical discourse and 
metaphor generates invention at the base and boundaries of scientific inquiry.  Mythos 
remains subliminally operative and functionally transformative in the living culture of the 
storytelling animal whose very life blood is possibility. 
 Still, we would like to get it right; indeed the literal bias of the modern temper 
rather insists on it, but we must trace back this particular obsession to its archaic source 
in wonder if we are to understand its nature and risk.  Arguably, the first point of critical 
separation of the mythic and historical, the factive from the fictive, is found in the 
development of ‗the Socratic Method.‘  The Platonic Dialogues mark the distinctive turn 
to an insistence on rational discourse as the touchstone of value and this also allegedly 
marks the fatal fracturing of reason and passion in philosophical inquiry.  However, we 
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will try to discern in this most enigmatic of the triumvirate of Classical Greek 
philosophers the more fundamental and sustaining resource of mythic energy that keeps 
open the possibilities of human imagination. Further developing the counsel of Socrates 
and framing the paidaeic project of Aristotle, Plato‘s poetic dialogues contain 
countervailing and contrapuntal elements of both mythos and logos.  It is the 
philosophical convergence of discursive logistics and dramatic erotics which make his 
work such a compelling study of Man as a changeling creature caught-between.  
 Throughout the Platonic corpus there are countless instances and uses of myth, 
allegory, and extended metaphor imbedded within the discursive logic of his Dialogues  
A long history of scholarship has argued the point and import of Plato‘s wide and 
effective use of what otherwise and in the context of his valuations he seems to dismiss as 
nonsense or insidious.  Should we believe what he says against what he does?  The 
rhetorical, dramatic, and figurative uses of myth are so obviously deliberate and 
intentionally integrated such that they cannot be dismissed as incidental accessories.  So 
what then are we to make of the fabulations of Plato in the midst of the serious business 
of a search for truth?  It is one thing to credit the great tragic dramatists with imaginative 
license and emotive excesses in the search for the darker reaches of the pathological in 
human perversions, marking the territory of That Way Be Dragons.  But et tu Plato?  
How and why myth and to what end in the larger body of his work? 
 I want to look briefly at one of Plato‘s Dialogues, more precisely at two sections 
of the Symposium, which I take to be a crucial index of what the thinker was about in his 
task of truth-telling concerning the nature and destiny of human kind.  I suspect it is more 
usual to think of the Symposium as a derivative, supplemental, or even incidental relief 
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text in the Platonic corpus, rather than generative for the whole of his systematic inquiry 
into Truth, Wisdom, and the Form of the Good.  But the erotic genesis of inquiry is the 
whole point of the text of this dialogue and as such marks the conceptual beginning of 
Plato‘s central project of achieving a synoptic vision of reality. 
 Of the two myths to be discussed in Plato‘s Symposium one is familiar and oft-
cited (the speech of Aristophanes), the other is more complex and variously interpreted 
(the dialectical teaching of Diotima). Both occur in the context of a gathering of friends 
to celebrate the victory of a tragic dramatist during the festival of Dionysos.  The evening 
is given to drinking and conversation, and an invitation is given to each person to address 
an encomium to Love. In Aristophanes‘ speech, Plato has the great comic dramatist relate 
a fabulous myth which depicts the human condition as one driven by desire resulting 
from a radically divided soul in which the separate parts are condemned to search the 
world for completion and fulfillment by reuniting with its other half.  Characteristically, 
the effect of Aristophanes‘ myth is a deep mix of comic pathos.  The original rotund 
creatures possessed of two heads, four arms, four legs, etc., were  so aggressive, 
obnoxious, and threatening that the god split them in half—creating a vast community of 
half-life beings whose plaintive existence is driven by an obsession to recover their whole 
identity through the other.  Given the great plurality of people and expanse of the world, 
and given the complexities of ordinary human association along with the risk and pain of 
experimental intimacy, the prospect of reconciliation is not optimal.  At root this 
fabulation has the telling truth and compelling reality of common human experience.  If 
Socratic wisdom consists in striving the whole of our lives so that the end of all our 
striving will be to return to where we began and know the place for the first time—that is, 
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if the journey of the intellect is for the mind to come to understand what in some 
important and archaic sense it already knows, then this myth represents an important 
parallel with respect to the journey of the heart.  There is in each person a life-long 
striving to arrive whence we began, and there is the hope that if we are fully alive, 
sensitive and open to the risks of desire, then we may finally come to ourselves in simple 
fulfillment of the nature of our existence.  However poignant the human situation seems 
under Aristophanes‘ comic tale, there is promise as well—a further analogue to the myth 
of human discord that placed hope in the bottom of Pandora‘s Box. 
 The series of encomia to love in the Symposium predictably reflect the character 
of each speaker and further index the relation each has to this most intimate and binding 
phenomenon of social existence.  Recall that the series begins with a speech in praise of 
that first impulse of desire in the journey toward beauty and truth: the physical attraction 
to the body of the ‗other.‘  But in terms of Aristophanes‘ interpretive myth this means 
that we are drawn out of ourselves toward ourselves.  Each speech expands the domain 
and level of this impulse, in which Love, Desire, Eros, is depicted variously as a young 
playful and vigorous god, as a great benevolent god of age and wisdom, as the most 
beautiful of gods…until it is the turn of the old satyr Socrates.  Subsequent to 
Aristophanes‘ account, and leading up to Socrates‘ interrogatories, the host and honoree 
of the symposium, the new and victorious playwright Agathon, flushed with victory, 
pictures the god in his own image, as if he were looking into a mirror for a likeness.  One 
is reminded of Nietzsche‘s remark about one loving that in which they find their own 
strength.  It remains for Socrates to lift the discourse to embrace the whole of humanity. 
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III 
The love and pursuit of wisdom in its most general as opposed to professionally 
philosophical sense is a journey without a destination.  As such the journey itself a 
fabulation of human sensibility—desire in search of its ground, the soul in search of its 
sense and limits.  Its object is the subject itself.  The Greeks analyzed desire as a lack, as 
an immediate and compelling sense of incompleteness, and as such at the heart and 
impulse of all movement.  It is significant that Plato places the mythic account of desire 
at the root of human endeavor in the character and voice of the comic poet, who begins in 
a playful and vulgar style in keeping with his reputation.  The burlesque gives way 
however to a more somber rendition of desire in human longing for a soul mate that will 
reconcile the divided self. Recalling why Zeus split in two the strident creatures of the 
originating species, there is reason to question the wisdom of any reunion. However 
poignant the plight of the human being so divided, this reminder of what a permanent 
reconciliation would restore in the form of the two headed many armed monster suggests 
the human being is a finer and nobler creature when caught up in the infinite and insistent 
space of desire.  This sense of the incompleteness of human endeavor is familiar 
characteristic of the eristic activity and aporetic discourse of the early ‗Socratic‘ 
dialogues, but it is true also in the more ambitious epistemic extensions of the later 
dialogues.  There is, for example, a characteristic lack of closure even in the Republic 
when the question is put at the end of the long discussion, looking back on the 
constructed ideal system of rational order of human community ‗But how and when will 
all this come to pass…?‘  To which Plato has Socrates respond ―Not until philosophers 
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become kings and kings philosophers.‖  In both conceptual and historical terms, this must 
mean something like ‗When hell freezes over.‘  A reconciliation of ideas and the framing 
of ideals is one thing, but human life fraught with desire is something quite other, and 
Plato again counters the idyllic rationality of the Republic as well as the exacting 
epistemic but still incomplete efforts at birthing knowledge in the Theaetetus with the 
great dialogue and dialectic of desire in the Symposium.  
 The lesson of the Symposium in the larger body of Plato‘s work suggests that the 
rational framing of the instrumentality and power of Logos requires an associated 
discourse of Mythos, and a generative base of Eros.  Reason and passion, inference and 
inclination, deduction and desire are always in play if not in concert.  Aristotle confirms 
this same point in his founding insight that wisdom begins in wonder. He includes what 
amounts to a cosmic addendum that acknowledges desire at the root of all things—that 
the principle of all motion is attraction.  In the different context and concern of the 
Symposium, the teaching of Diotima is that only the gods remain unchanged: in mortals 
attributes pass away and age, but they leave behind a new generation of possibilities that 
enable mortal life a share in immortality. 
Plato‘s efforts to circumscribe the limits of desire on the positive side, that is, at 
the highest reach of intelligence and imagination, invariably meet with a discursive 
aporia at which point he resorts to the dramatic figuration of myth, metaphor and 
allegory.  Although Plato was patently hostile to the use of fabulation and provided 
extended critiques of differing orders against the various arts and their disfiguring 
conceits, he nonetheless found it necessary to supplement and contextualize his vision of 
human aspiration and achievement in figurative terms.  Many of these dramatic vignettes 
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have made their way into the canon of world literature quite apart from the abstract 
corpus of Plato‘s philosophical work.  The most famous is likely the ‗Allegory of the 
Cave‘, from the Republic, which is sufficiently well known not to require detailed 
description here.  The fabulation of this allegory is first of all a portrait of the human 
condition as an imprisonment of the senses.  The world into which we awaken is a life 
buried in the deep cave of a shadowland in which phenomena play across a dimly lit 
cavern and knowledge is limited to guessing the sequence of their occurrence.  Shackled 
to this world of shadows in a flickering and false light of enfeebled perception, the 
ambitions of relational desire is limited to cleverness, where prizes are awarded to those 
who provide the most persuasive story of sequencing.  This allegory is usually read in 
epistemic terms as a figurative framing of Plato‘s theory of knowledge, one that requires 
the transcendence of phenomenal appearance toward an ideal world of enlightenment 
independent of the senses.  So considered, it serves as a dramatic analogue to Plato‘s 
discursive explication of ascendance to the realm of intelligibility in the equally famous 
theory of the divided line.  Our interest in this essay, however, will remain with the 
developmental issue of desire and with the apparently necessary discourse of fabulations 
through which the nature of desire finds adequate expression.   
At the basic erotic level the crudity of desire demands immediate gratification in a 
physical object, a raw craving for the other.  In the Symposium this level consists in an 
enflamed desire for the body of a beautiful youth.  In the corresponding allegorical 
context of the Cave, however, it is clear that such an appeal leaves desire in possession of 
an empty husk, the faint satisfaction of an embracing shadow.  Plato‘s cave and its 
shadow-world recalls the Underworld of Homer, in which the wandering Odysseus meets 
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the shade of great Achilles who soon disabuses him of any notion that power, authority or 
prestige exist among the faded creatures of Hades.  Desire is empty in such regions, 
whether in Hades or among the idle and vacant distractions of a world devoid of 
transcendence. At the same time, however, Plato makes clear that it is in the visceral 
commonplace of craving that one discovers in oneself the base stirrings of a desire.  It is 
through effort and direction that this primitive desire becomes the aspiration of wisdom—
a desire which, taken root, transforms the self and the world it inhabits. 
Plato‘s measured constraint in this initial position is to insist that from any level 
of apprehension deserving the name ―humanity‖ it makes little difference whether the 
movement is that of an organism above or a shade below: fulfillment is hollow without a 
transcendent aspiration of desire.  The life journey from out of the cave is not only 
toward cognitive enlightenment, but one in search of moral and emotional maturity.  
Once free of the shackles of immediacy, desire effects a transformation of intellect and 
imagination toward the soul‘s fulfillment.  It is convenient to mark the stages of this 
ascendancy of desire in the lexicon of Love within classical Greek literature in terms of 
libidos (the first and sustaining movement of life energy) through Eros (the cathecting 
immediacy of desire on available objects) to philein (recognition of the mediating 
reciprocity of the desire of others) to agape (the fulfillment of desire in realization of 
human possibility.)  This characterization of the growth and maturation of desire which is 
developed in the Symposium is a moral and emotional analogue to the wisdom of human 
aspiration that begins in the movement out of the cave into the light in Plato‘s Republic. 
So who and what is this creature that struggles out of the cocoon of the senses, 
who emerges from a primitive encapsulation and begins its journey to overcome the 
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remnants of its birthing?  Plato‘s answer is to describe a philosophical animal, one whose 
realization of desire gradually transforms a world of contingency and necessity into a 
realm of freedom and beauty—a creature that in transforming its environment transforms 
itself. 
Plato‘s metaphor for this changeling creature is that of pregnancy: a human being 
is a creature of desire whose manifest destiny in wisdom is to give birth in beauty.  The 
characteristic figure in this process is Socrates as midwife as described in the Theaetetus. 
This self-description and model of the teacher is confirmed throughout the Platonic 
corpus, in which we discover Socrates assisting others both in finding a source of the 
beautiful and of assisting in the birthing and examination of the created offspring. In the 
Theaetetus, it is argued that while all men are pregnant, not all are ready for the labor that 
will bring forth promising offspring.  Even the most earnest among those who labor bring 
forth wind-eggs and become discouraged in their passion.   
The Symposium gives an account of the origin and development of this idea of 
birthing, and this once again requires the figuration of the fabulous: males are pregnant 
and laboring to give birth, seeking a transcendence not only of the prison of the senses 
but of the time of their tenure in the world.  The point of all pregnancy, as explained in 
the concluding wisdom of Diotima, is immortality—either through the natural physical 
begetting of children, or through the intellectual and imaginative creation of immortal 
thoughts, deeds, or works. 
IV 
That Plato was ever in search of truth and reality is not in question, of course, but 
it is also the case that in order to do this he must construct a world in which his former 
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teacher appears throughout as a protagonist of mythic proportions.  No less an authority 
than Shelley, who translated the Symposium, refers to the poetic structure of the Platonic 
corpus in his essay on the Defense of Poetry arguing that Plato was essentially a poet 
such that the truth and splendor of his imagery are matched by the melody of his 
language.  Shelley claims to be following Plato in holding that the exercise of every 
imaginative art is poetry.  His further thesis in a famous and often contested passage is 
that poets who imagine the indestructible order of beauty are more than authors of 
language, music and painting but are also founders of civil society and inventors of the 
arts of life.  Shelley‘s claim that poets become teachers by drawing near to the beautiful 
and true reflects his general understanding of Plato‘s work grounded in the force of the 
poetics of the Symposium. 
 There is reason to believe that the historical Socrates, as he remarks in his own 
words in the Phaedo, is not a mythologist, not a ‗teller of stories‘.  His basic attitude was 
critically opposed to the fancy of poetic conceit, and the purpose of his inquiry essentially 
aporetic—to bring discourse only to the point of its limits. Not so Plato; although he 
burned his tragedies when he took up philosophy at the death of Socrates he retained a 
poetic sense for the importance of the mythic in his development of the genre of 
philosophical drama.  The major emphasis of his work is committed to transcendence 
toward a synoptic vision of reality, which could not be fully developed within the 
logistical constraints of argumentative discourse.  Plato is more than a creator of 
particular contextual myths.  His incorporation of the mythic begins and is sustained 
through his depiction of Socrates—a character of mythic proportions who is a fusion of 
logos and mythos, ethos and pathos.  Among the countless fabulations of  Socrates 
 18 
throughout Plato‘s Dialogues perhaps the most important for our purposes is found in the 
closing sequence of the Symposium.  In a mock encomium to the god of love, the drunken 
interloper Alkibiades likens Socrates to the Sileni, the seduction of his words having the 
same effect as the flute playing of the demon Marsyas.  That Socrates is here and 
throughout depicted as an erotic force comparable to the fabled satyr of Dionysian 
passion is evidence of Plato‘s commitment to revitalize the tradition of myth that was 
being displaced from the literature of his time.  Euripides‘s dismissal of myth from the 
Dionysian ritual of drama in favor of common characters and ordinary life signaled an 
end to the tradition and depth of the tragic vision once achieved in Aeschylus and 
Sophocles.  In its place Plato offers a new mythic genre that provides a conceptual and 
creative base to revitalize the possibilities inherent in the metaphysical depth of tragic 
drama.  Although Plato no longer probes the darkness of the human soul characteristic of 
tragedy, his dialectical drama draws on the residual depths of the earlier drama.  The 
Platonic Dialogue neither rivals nor replaces the great tradition of the tragic dramatists, 
but as evidenced in the Symposium, it does transform into a new key a human drama 
grounded in passion. 
 In the Symposium Plato constructs a variegated account of the strange creature 
Eros in such a way to mirror the various mythic images of the satyr figure of Socrates.  
Neither god nor man, the daemon Eros is the child of Poros and Penia—an offspring of 
the coupling of affluence and poverty; he is, in the solemn description of the priestess 
Diotima, rough and disheveled, without house or shoes one who sleeps in the open streets 
and alleys of the world.  However, he was conceived during the birthday celebration of 
Aphrodite so he is a lover of beauty and a pursuer of good, and thus a driving force in the 
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relations and aspirations of human beings toward virtue and wisdom.  Neither Eros, love 
nor Socrates, teacher possess the good, the true, or the beautiful, but they are so disposed 
in nature that they aspire to these things, and in so doing inspire others to do the same.  
We  are thus given the condition of human-being as divided and infused with need and 
longing, but having manifest possibility, pregnant with the prospect of great thoughts and 
deeds needing only to be brought forth in beauty.  The journey of man is always toward 
the fulfillment of this possibility—the birthing of human excellence through the love of 
another. 
 The self is divided in its very nature throughout Plato‘s range of mythic images.  
The description in the Republic is the familiar political myth of human soul as tripartite, 
composed of intellect, spirit, and appetite.  Later in that same work Plato constructs a 
fabulation fashioned after the mythic beasts of the Chimera, Scylla, and Cerberus.  This 
image of the soul is the mythic figure of a three headed beast or rather three beasts joined 
together ‗naturally‘: the first a multicolored beast with a ring of man-heads that grow and 
change at will, the second beast that of a lion, and the last in the figure of an ordinary 
human being, the composite given the outward features of the latter.  In the Republic, 
Plato‘s subject is the just soul, and his analysis here is that the manifest soul will be 
determined by which of the beasts are fed and nurtured—if the first two are favored and 
the last neglected or starved then the different parts of the beast will devour and kill one 
another. To achieve a harmony of soul, clearly the human intellect must make the 
courage and strength of the lion an ally in order to control and domesticate the many 
appetites of the multiform beast of the passions.   
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The nature of the soul for Plato is movement; the virtue of the immortal soul is 
life. Prior to its incarnation the soul, as it is pictured in the Phaedrus, is winged and feeds 
on the pure forms of the true and the good, but incarnated in human form it is weighed 
down in visceral accessories and torn by good and bad desires.  In yet another tripartite 
image this soul is depicted in terms of a charioteer with a team of horses, one good, one 
bad.  The soul is attracted, as in the Symposium first to the sight of a beautiful youth, 
which brings to mind the idea and ideal of beauty itself.  The soul takes wing at the 
aspect of beauty but there ensues a struggle between the two horses, between the base and 
higher impulses of passion.  The task of the charioteer is to bring the team into harmony 
of action and aspiration.  It is clear that neither love nor beauty alone will satisfy the need 
of the soul for fulfillment, but also that both the carnal and the spiritual impulses of the 
soul remain active in its journey.  
The detail and stages of this journey is the subject text of the Symposium and the 
capstone of that dialectical discussion is the teaching of Diotima in which she instructs 
the young Socrates on love.  She teaches that the object of love is not beauty, as many 
think, it is birth.  Procreation is the closest things mortals can get to immortality.  At this 
most basic level of generative desire, Diotima explains that its source is not reason, for 
animals too are seized by desire and will sacrifice everything to protect their offspring.  
Mortal nature itself is locked into an imperative to overcome mortality.  If wisdom is to 
achieve birth in beauty then clearly its object is immortality 
 Even where the question of a Dialogue is more narrowly directed to 
epistemology—the nature of knowledge rather than love or wisdom—the imperative of 
desire is still present.  Socrates is depicted in the Theaetetus as a midwife assisting in the 
 21 
labor of bringing to birth the truth that is in each person, a truth through which one 
participates in immortality if only for the moment its realization.  The sole resource for 
this birthing is the reproductive capacity to constantly replace the past generation with a 
new one.  An individual is constantly renewed and constantly losing other qualities. Plato 
observes that no characteristics, traits, beliefs, desires, delights, troubles or fears ever 
remain the same.  And it is the same with knowledge: it comes and goes, is manifest and 
is replaced.  Despite Plato‘s modal paradigm of form, clearly he acknowledges here the 
more fundamental flow of reality in our perception of human life and world. 
V 
 The question finally is why a master dialectician like Plato who insisted that all 
values be rational resorts to fabulation.  The simple answer is that the human creature and 
its world at issue is itself fabulous. Any adequate description of the changeling whose 
mortal nature is freedom and whose passion is immortality cannot be circumscribed in 
any but mythic idioms.  Implicit in Nietzsche‘s insight that the genius of classical Greek 
drama was its celebration of both gods, Dionysos and Apollo, is the parallel notion that 
no culture can be fully alive to human possibility that has lost its sense of myth   I am 
suggesting, however, that Nietzsche is wrong to dismiss Plato from attending the shrines 
of these gods, albeit in a different way from the tragic dramatists.  We have already noted 
Plato‘s engagement and extension of the mythic tradition through the various forms of 
metaphor and fabulation.  The seminal nature of Eros in the Symposium that frames the 
rest of his work indicates Plato‘s broader though seldom acknowledged recognition of the 
tensions of Logos and Mythos at the heart of his dialectic.  The extent and importance of 
fabulation in Plato‘s work makes it clear that his rational dialectic should be regarded 
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also as a passionate journey that embraces the creative fissions and fusions that fully 
constitute human reality. 
If philosophy remains rooted in the pursuit of wisdom, then it must track and trace 
the machinations of imagination that frame the always-to-be-determined nature of the 
forever divided creature that would be god.  The trick in discerning this fabulous beast is 
not to domesticate its prodigious achievements but also to celebrate the imaginative reach 
and the splendor of its failings.  To do this, philosophy must reconnect with the mythic 
tradition kept alive in the poetry of the world‘s great literature. 
To say that the human-being of the creature caught between is undetermined is in 
moral terms to acknowledge that its nature is freedom.  In Sartre‘s expression it is not 
what it is, and is what it is not.  The language of fabulation allows for the loosening of the 
logistical binds that traditionally have fixed the nature of this transformational enigma.  
The cultural convergence of the various allegedly rival discourses of ethics politics, 
economics, biology and theology attests to the dominant tradition that seeks to delineate 
the defining limits of this changeling creature.  But each completed tapestry of culture 
includes a ghostline to the literature of fabulation.   The mythic impulse in literature must 
continue to search for resonance with the uncanny, the surreal, and those existential 
fragments of imagination that bear witness to the flow of reality beneath the form of 
conjecture.  The fictive discourse of fabulation keeps alive the Dionysian impulse that 
resists fixation and keeps faith with an alternative discourse in which the understanding 
of human being is enriched under the aspect of exception. 
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